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Newsletter #230 
Gulf Crisis 
We Still Won't Go 
In this issue ofResist we solicited two per-
spectives on the current crisis in the Per-
sian Gulf. Joe Gerson, of the American 
Friends Service Committee in New Eng-
land, focuses on why Saddam Hussein 
invaded Kuwait, and the meaning of the 
U.S. reaction in terms of the post-Cold 
War realignment of power in the world. 
Irene Gendzier, who teaches the history of 
the Middle East at Boston University and 
is the author of several books on political 
development in the region, stresses the his-
torical antecedents to the crisis, deploring 
the "dismal state of the discourse" on 
U.S/Middle East policies. Both writers 
agree that the time has come to demand 
an end to the consensus by silence on U.S. 
hegemony in the region and to force by 
our protests the immediate withdrawal of 
U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia. Though 
this is the goal, we at Resist believe it may 
indeed be some time before the crisis sub-
sides. In the coming months, we hope to 
print additional perspectives on shifting 
political alliances in the Middle East, and 
on strategies and tactics for the peace 
movement at home. We are particularly 
interested in the point of view of women 
and ethnic minorities in the region. If you 
have comments or suggestions for Resist 
articles on these topics, please contact our 
newsletter editor, Tatiana Schreiber, at the 
office. For information about organizing 
efforts in the Boston area, contact the 
Mobilization for Survival at (617) 354-
0008. Nationally, call (212) 385-2222. 
A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority November, 1990 
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U.S./Iraq War: 
New Order ''In a World Gone Mad" 
JOSEPH GERSON 
The period of U.S. preparation for war 
against Iraq is drawing to a close. The 
United States has assembled more than 
20.0,000 troops, an aerial armada, and a 
naval flotilla in Saudi Arabia, other Gulf 
states, Turkey, the Persian Gulf, and the 
Arabian Sea. President Bush has staked 
his political future on Iraq's unconditional 
withdrawal from Kuwait, even as his 
administration is opposing Iraqi, Arab and 
French diplomatic efforts to provide Hus-
sein a face-saving way to leave Iraq. Tune 
is running out. In the words of Senator 
Kennedy: "The President is heading for 
war - perhaps next week, perhaps next 
month, but almost certainly by the end of 
the year." With the new year will come 
sand stonns and then intense desert heat 
- two more reasons that war is likely to 
be launched sooner rather than later. 
This will not be a replay of Panama or 
Grenada. The toll is likely to be thousands 
of U.S. lives, hundreds of thousands of 
Iraqi and Kuwaiti lives, the devastation of 
the land, and the disappearance of whatev-
er shred of respect lingers for the U.S. in 
the Middle East 
The 1980s provided dress rehearsals 
for this war: the Iraq/Iran war, and U.S. 
military intervention on Iraq's behalf; the 
invasions of Grenada and Panama; 
hostages and U.S. Marines in Lebanon; 
economic embargoes against Nicaragua, 
Vietnam and Cambodia; the budget battle 
and the battle for "burdensharing"; war 
games in Egypt and the construction of 
U.S. bases in Saudi sands and in nations 
surrounding the Gulf. The rehearsals are 
over and the struggle is now on to shape 
the contours of the post-Cold War era. 
Would that issues were simple, either/ 
or, black and white. Saddam Hussein has 
long been among the world's most vicious 
dictators. The pillage of Kuwait and the 
terrorization of its people are but the 
(il)logical extension of his brutal rule. The 
Iraqi conquest of Kuwait can only be con-
demned and resisted. But, as U .N. Secre-
tary General Perez de Cuellar repeated, the 
U. S. exceeded the Security Council's 
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m~date by unilaterally deploying military 
forces and establishing a blockade - an 
act of war - against Iraq. As King Hus-
sein of Jordan desperately observed, the 
U.S. deployments have made the con-
frontation far more dangerous, a "crisis in 
a world gone mad." The U .N. called for 
sanctions and an embargo, not war. The 
Soviet Union has thus far refused to give 
the U.S. a U.N. flag and a carte blanche 
for a war the U .N. cannot control. 
There is cruel irony in that the U.S. 
re-conquered Panama just last December, 
and secret mass graves of Panamanian 
civilian victims of that war are just now 
being discovered. Moreover, the U.S.'s 
allies in the Gulf confrontation include 
Turkey, which has occupied portions of 
Cyprus for 16 years; Morocco, which has 
occupied the Spanish Sahara since the fall 
of Franco; Syria with its 40,000 troops in 
Lebanon; and of course, Israel which has 
militarily occupied the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip for 23 years and which has 
annexed the occupied Golan Heights and 
Palestinian East Jerusalem. 
Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait 
The media's demonization of Saddam 
continued on page five 
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Bequests 
If you are in the process of writing or 
amending your Will, you might think about 
leaving a set sum or a percentage to Resist, 
Inc. Over the last year a number of you have 
contacted us directly or through a lawyer, 
informing us of your decision to include us in 
your Will. For all of you who took that 
difficult but important s~p of writing a Will, 
and including Resist 'in it, we are most 
appreciative. Wills can be a significant way 
of making sure the work you support today 
will be around for decades to come. And 
because Resist, Inc. is a non-profit, tax 
exempt corporation, including us in your Will 
can help lower or eliminate estate taxes. 
When including Resist in your Will, 
please identify us as follows: ''Resist, Inc., a 
Massachusetts non-profit corporation whose 
principal place of business is located in 
Somerville, Massachusetts." If you have any 
questions about including Resist in your Will, 
or if you need a copy of our tax exempt IRS 
letter, please feel free to write or call the 
office. 
************************• 
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For information and grant guidelines write to: 
Resist , One Summer St., Somerville, MA 02143 
The Resist News/el/er is published ten 
times a year by Resist, Inc. , One Summer 
Street, Somerville, MA 02143. (617) 
623-51 I 0. The views expressed in articles, 
other than editorials, are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent 
the opinions of the Resist staff or board. 
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The Gulf Crisis: 
Unasked Questions on the U.S. in the Middle East 
IRENE GENDZIER 
A political earthquake is in the mak-
ing in the Persian Gulf. Whatever the out-
come, and the options are few, it is safe to 
say that the Middle East will not be the 
same. This is not a lament, but a reflection 
on the dimensions of a crisis as complex 
as it is divisive and dangerous for the peo-
ples of the region. From the initial inva-
sion of Kuwait by Iraq, to the response it 
evoked in the U.S. and the West, the mul-
tiplicity of issues involved is staggering, 
the stakes are high, the conflicts deep and 
the potential for massive destruction evi-
dent Everywhere there is fear, uncertainty, 
and a deep disquiet about what tomorrow 
will bring. 
In the Middle East, the crisis has 
exposed the disparate, desperate, and con-
tradictory nature of Arab state politics. 
Simmering beneath the frantic movements 
of Arab leaders for political expediency 
are deeply rooted divisions of states, sear-
ing class conflicts, the frustrations of deal-
ing with repressive regimes, and pervasive 
despair generated by unresolved conflicts 
in the region. 
This explosive combination of factors 
was not created by the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait The alienation, anger and despair 
were everywhere to be seen prior to Iraq's 
recent aggression. But the mobilization by 
the U.S. of a vast military armada sta-
tioned in Saudi Arabia has - far more 
than the reaction of the U.S.S.R. or the 
United Nations - catapulted Arab 
regimes out of their habitual alliances, and 
alerted them to the dangers from belo.w, 
from the ready anger of their own masses. 
There is another kind of crisis brew-
ing, this one at home. It involves the 
widening gap between a U.S. military 
force poised for war, and a population 
becoming increasingly resentful and 
apprehensive about this country's econom-
ic recession. The budget debacle, the 
threat of economic depression, and 
widespread discontent with. political 
incumbents may combine to force Amer-
icans to rethink the costs of the U.S. 
response to the Gulf crisis. The absence of 
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any sustained discussion of what U.S. 
interests are or should be, of how involved 
the U.S. is and has been in the domestic 
politics of the region, is no longer tenable 
or tolerable. 
In short, the time has come to put 
U.S. policy toward the Middle East on the 
agenda. Support for international efforts, 
including the efforts of Middle Eastern 
states, to resolve the current crisis by dip-
lomatic means, is imperative. This means 
support for: the restoration of Kuwaiti sov-
ereignty; the adjudication of the·oil pricing 
controversy which antedated the crisis; the 
implementation of UN. resolutions for the 
Gulf and other areas of the Middle East; 
and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Saudi Arabia. 
Controversy over the issue of 'link-
age' between the · Gulf crisis and the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict is a diversion. 
That conflict is an inextricable part of 
Middle Eastern politics, no matter how 
exploited, and it should be resolved on its 
wants to avoid confrontation with a region 
that does not confonn to its image in the 
U.S. In fact, Arab politics, with all its 
internal differences, challenges both the 
Israeli and U.S. views of the Arab world 
and Palestinian policies. 
The agenda on the Middle East, freed 
of such restrictions, must include one fun-
damental question: what are U.S. interests 
in the Gulf and the Middle East? How is it 
that some former Reagan administration 
officials contest that this is an area neces-
sary for the "national security" while this 
administration says the reverse? Why has 
no congressional voice been raised to 
question exactly what the administration 
means when its officials talk of an extend-
ed stay in the Gulf! And what of oil com-
panies, and their exceptionally low pro-
file? And what of arms, and specifically, 
the contribution of the U.S. and most of 
the other states aligned against Iraq, to the 
escalation of the arms race in the Middle 
East? 
The absence of any sustained discussion of what U.S. 
interests are or should be, of how involved the U.S. is and 
has been in the domestic politics of the region, is no longer 
tenable or tolerable. In short, the ti,me has come to put U.S. 
policy toward the Middle East on the agenda. · 
own terms and in the. interest of those 
directly concerned. Clearly, the dynamic 
of the present crisis may convince the 
Bush administration that it is desirable to 
move in this direction, in order to maintain 
the Arab coalition supporting the U,.S. mil-
itary presence on Saudi soil. One can 
expect that support for such a move will 
be followed by an even more intense 
polarization in the discussion on the 
American scene, where the subject of 
Israel's Palestinian policy has long been 
politically taboo. 
It is more than that conflict that has 
been taboo, however. An official silence, 
supported by a broad consensus has long 
been extended to discussion of U.S.-Mid-
dle East policies. This is a side effect of an 
administration policy that at all costs 
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The Shifting World Environment 
Admittedly, the environment in which 
all of this is happening is changing rapidly 
and the changes directly affect the unfold-
ing situation in the region. Collaboration 
with the Soviet Union, and the enhance-
ment of the role of the UN, are two obvi-
ous shifts. The impact of the first on the 
Middle East has yet to be assessed, but it 
is safe to say that it has changed the over-
all balance of power. It changes the basis 
of the Israeli relationship with the U.S., 
long justified in tenns of the need to con-
tain the Cold War in the Middle East, as 
well as to provide the U.S. with the capac-
ity to confront nationalist, populist or radi-
cal movements within the region, and to 
provide intelligence on the Arab world for 
the same purpose. 
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Unasked Questions 
continued from page three 
Given the new U.S./Soviet alignment, 
the first justification is no longer relevan\ 
and the second and third may have dimin-
ished in importance. The current crisis 
then may begin to erode U.S. support for 
Israel, particularly if the interests of the 
Israeli right wing government collide with 
those of the U.S. over the matters of 
expanding Israeli settlements in the occu-
pied territories, and UN. inspection teams 
investigating Israeli violence against 
Palestinians. 
Within the Middle ·East, even short of 
war, the crisis has already unsettled the 
existing alignment of forces. The legacy of 
wars, dislocation, and the sense of utter 
hopelessness at achieving meaningful 
political solutions of the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict and the Lebanese civil war, have 
produced generations of people who know 
only too well how selective the response 
to their suffering has been. The violence of 
indifference is no stranger here. Neither is 
the casualty rate of poverty, the price paid 
for forms of economic maldevelopment 
that lead to the migration of labor, and 
with it, often, the degradation of spirit and 
of law. 
That the Iraqi leader, whose brutality 
is fully known, is capable of exploiting 
this web of discontent, is a reflection of 
the dire conditions in the region. Given 
what Hussein's regime represents, his abil-
ity to generate support is not a simple 
thing to countenance, or, indeed, to 
explain. For many Saddam Hussein has 
come to embody the only choice in the 
face of what are perceived to be impossi-
ble odds. This is testimony to the failures 
of Arab politics, as well as the hobbled 
sovereignty of the states in the region. 
Antecedents or the Present Crisis 
Where, in this itemization of despair, 
does responsibility lie? What accounts for 
the deep resonance that this crisis has pro-
duced? Is it 1914 and the partition of the 
Ottoman Empire, the precursor of today's 
Middle East? Or is it developments since 
1945 that offer the most meaningful paral-
lels: the incomplete struggles for liberation 
and independence across North Africa and 
the Middle East; the creation of Israel and 
the Palestine question; the emergence of 
oil states with their black gold and reac-
tionary politics; and the post-colonial 
regional struggles? No attempt to think 
through to the origins of the present crisis 
can ignore the weight of a turbulent past, 
or the impact of political struggles that 
antedated the present crisis. 
In the short term, the meaning of the 
Pog,Four 
Gulf crisis of 1990 has to be understood as 
the continuation of a struggle initiated by 
the fall of the Shah and the emergence of 
fundamentalist Iran in 1979, which trans-
formed the Middle East and resulted in the 
mobilization of forces to contain Iran's 
fundamentalist revolution. On the popular 
level, fundamentalism soon became the 
politics of opposition, before being coopt-
ed by states eager to increase their own 
legitimacy. 
In this context, the Iraqi regime came 
to be the chosen force to contain the 
expansion of Iranian fundamentalism, and 
was backed in its efforts by the very pow-
ers of the Gulf and the U.S. now arrayed 
against it. Iraq was also one of the chief 
beneficiaries of the escalation of arms 
going into the Gulf region in this period. 
All of the states now joined in opposition 
to Iraq are among the major suppliers of 
lethal weapons to the Middle East In the 
Gulf war, according to one estimate, some 
41 states sold arms and ammunition to 
either Iran or Iraq, and 28 to both. 
(Michael Klare, "Who's Arming Who?" 
The Technology Review, Mayllune 1990). 
At the present time Iraq has the use of 
sophisticated weapons and technology 
purchased for an estimated $50 billion 
over the past few years. What those 
weapons are and what they are capable of 
doing we are now familiar with, though 
the bad news has long been available. 
Why it should have been of so little inter-
est is something we ought to be asking 
ourselves. 
Where does the U.S. stand in this situ-
ation? On the brink of war. With a mobili-
zation of armed forces unequalled since 
the Vietnam War, the U.S. has achieved 
objectives in the Gulf previously consid-
ered politically impossible, namely, the 
Saudi Arabian government's acceptance of 
a U.S. military presence on its territory. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has deep-
ened, though not fundamentally altered 
U.S. interests in the region. 
What we now see, U.S. support for 
the oil rich regions of the Gulf and support 
for Israel, constitute the twin poles of U.S. 
policy, with the former the more funda-
mental to U.S. interests. This explains the 
U.S. position during the Iran/Iraq war, and 
the tilt toward Iraq which was premised -
not on the superiority of Iraq over Iran -
but on the principle of prohibiting any sin-
gle regional power from dominating the 
area. Then, it was Iran; now it is Iraq. 
Kuwait's place in the American conscious-
ness derives from this context 
The U.S. commitment to access and 
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control of petroleum resources in the Mid-
dle East goes back to the mid-1940's, as 
National Security Council and Intelligence 
reports on the region indicate. But the cur-
rent crisis forces us to consider a corollary 
to that commitment, namely, the extent to 
which every major policy in the Middle 
East has been subordinated to U.S. oil 
interests. This is the calculation that has 
influenced our choice of allies in the 
region, shaped our economic and military 
aid, and determined our position on the 
social and political movements that have 
rocked the area over the past forty years. 
This is the calculation that explains sup-
port for regimes whose leaders have per-
ilous little popular support, and whose 
commitment to democracy is nonexistent. 
It is ultimately this kind of reasoning that 
made the prospect of depending on an 
Arab solution to the Gulf crisis implausi-
ble, both because the stakes were so high 
and because Washington knew how little 
power these regimes could actually wield 
under the circumstances. 
No one watching the unfolding events 
of the last few months could fail to ask 
how it is that the U.S. did not appear to 
recognize the dangers posed by the Iraqi 
regime prior to the invasion of Kuwait. 
Why didn't the Bush administration, or the 
international community, call a global alert 
when faced with the knowledge of Iraqi 
use of chemical weapons against Kurds 
and Iranians? The information was avail-
able, the political will absent. Why were 
U.S. sanctions not applied? Why did the 
Congressional delegation meet with Sad-
dam Hussein and find him a potentially 
compatible partner? 
The dismal state of "discourse" on the 
Middle East which classified regimes as 
"moderates" or "extremists" has had deep-
er effects than we are prepared to admit. 
We know better now, and time is running 
out to question U.S. policy in the Middle 
East, and to challenge Congressional indif-
ference. 10/15J.}() • 
Irene Gendzier teaches the History of the 
Middle East and development issues in 
Political Science al Boston University. 
November, 1990 
New Order 
continued from page two 
Hussein and the rhetoric about "Hoo 
Sane" as Hitler have done little to inform 
us about the causes of the war, and instead 
have served to mobilize for war on the 
basis of racism. (One exception is David 
Hirst's insightful discussion of Hussein's 
childhood in the Manchester Guardian. 
Hirst's description of the physical and 
emotional abuse inflicted on Hussein as a 
child are reminiscent of psychoanalyst 
Alice Miller's study of Hitler's tormented 
youth, and remind us of the horrible 
dimensions in the cycle of child abuse.) 
Many rationales and forces drive a 
nation to war. Deeply indebted by a 
decade of conflict with Iran, the Iraqi gov-
ernment needed cash. The billions of dol-
lars it owed to the Emirate of Kuwait 
could be written off by a puppet gov-
ernment Cash to relieve its debts could be 
recovered from Kuwaiti banks and its 
investments around the world, as well as 
from selling Kuwait's oil. By controlling 
Kuwait, Iraq could ensure that it would 
never again steal from the Rumaila oil 
field, or drive down the value of Iraq's oil 
exports by exceeding its OPEC quota. 
As the U.S. military intervention 
against Iraq has ignited support among 
masses of people across the Arab world 
for Saddam Hussein, it has become 
increasingly clear that there was more to 
his invasion of Kuwait than madness, 
megalomania and the pursuit of plunder. 
Hussein did speak the truth when he ratio-
nalized the invasion, saying he sought to 
erase the wounds of colonialism. 
The national boundaries of the Middle 
East are the legacy of the colonial era. In 
some cases they reflect the outcome of 
struggles between the colonial powers. In 
other cases the boundaries were drawn to 
enforce policies of divide and conquer or 
to increase the dependence of newly inde-
pendent nations. While it had enjoyed con-
siderable autonomy over many centuries, 
Kuwait did not exist as a nation until 
Britain created it in an effort to circum-
scribe Iraq's power by limiting its direct 
access to the Persian Gulf. During the 
Ottoman Empire, the Emirs of Kuwait 
paid tribute to their overlords in Baghdad. 
Since 19'58, when the British-imposed 
monarchy in Iraq was toppled, Baghdad 
has claimed all or part of Kuwait It was 
fear that the 1958 Iraqi revolution would 
spill over into Kuwait that led the Eisen-
hower administration to threaten Iraq with 
nuclear attack and to position troops 
anned with short range nuclear weapons 
in Lebanon - the third of six times that 
Washington threatened to lallllch nuclear 
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Student groups join in Boston demonstration 
against U.S. militarization in the Gulf, 
Oct. 20, 1990. Photo: Ellen Shub. 
war during Middle East conflicts. 
Pan-Arab id~logy was another force 
behind Hussein's invasion. It springs from 
the shared religious, cultural and historical 
traditions that first unified much of South-
west Asia, the Levant and North Africa in 
the "golden age" that followed the Islamic 
conquest of the region by Arabians. Since 
the days of Gammal Nasser in Egypt, 
many in the Arab world have looked for a 
powerful leader who could reunify the 
"Arab nation" and right the wrongs of for-
eign occupiers and corrupt rulers. The 
Emir of Kuwait and the monarchies of the 
Gulf have been deeply resented for their 
failure to share their vast oil wealth with 
the poorer· nations and peoples of the 
region. It was to destabilize these U.S. 
clients and to reinforce his own base of 
support within Iraq that Hussein issµed his 
call for Holy War. 
Finally, Hussein has long sought to 
establish Iraq as the dominant regional 
power in the Gulf. It was his desire to 
replace the deposed Shah as the most pow-
erful regional leader, and his belief that 
post-revolutionary Iran could be quickly 
defeated that led him to order his army to 
cross the Shatt al Arab into Iran. He may 
have concluded that in the confusion and 
wicertainty of the emerging post-Cold War 
environment, he could occupy and 
"digest" Kuwait before the world could 
respond. 
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U.S. Intervention and the Price of Oil 
Just as the U.S. war in Indochina was 
no accident, but the logical consequence 
of fifteen years of Cold War ideology and 
the Kennedy administration's military pol-
icy of "flexible response," the U.S. inter-
vention in the Gulf is the (il)logical conse-
quence of the repeated commitments of 
successive presidents - from FDR's well 
photographed summit with King Saud, 
through the Carter Doctrine and the Rea-
gan/Bush policy of "Discriminate Deter-
rence." Over the past decade, instead of 
pursuing diplomatic options for conflict 
resolution, or an energy policy that would 
truly serve U.S. and environmental inter-
ests, the U.S. has invested in preparations 
for war in the Middle East 
The Reagan-era military spending 
spree funded not only Star Wars but mili-
tary bases in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kenya, 
Somalia, Morocco, Diego Garcia and a 
host of other nations. It financed the 
expansion of the U.S. Navy for precisely 
the kind of intervention we are now wit-
nessing. It was also the period during 
which the Rapid Deployment Force was 
transformed into the Pentagon's Central 
Command. The pressure on Bush and the 
national security establishment in Wash-
ington to rely on the contingency plans, 
bases, hardware and policies already in 
pJace, despite informed calls for diploma-
cy and patience by such elite figures as 
Zbigniew Brzezinski and former Secretary 
of the Navy West has been overwhelming. 
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New Order 
continued from page five 
President Bush was right when he 
said Iraq's invasion of Kuwait threatened 
our "way of life." While the U.S. inter-
vention may be making the world safe for 
feudalism and monarchies, it is hardly a 
pursuit of democratic values (and like all 
wars it will undennine democratic value.~ 
and structure~ within the U.S.) Since the 
end of World War II the U.S. "way of life" 
has, in large measure, been based on its 
access to cheap oil and its unquestioned 
role as the hegemonic power in the oil rich 
Middle East (After factoring in inflation, 
the price of oil was at its lowest level in 
thirty years immediately before the Iraqi 
invasion.) The invasion of Kuwait chal-
lenged both the U.S.'s ability to control oil 
prices, and its role as the final arbiter in 
the Middle East. As Thomas Friedman 
wrote in the New York Times, "This is 
about money, and protecting governments 
loyal to America and punishing those 
which are not, and about who will set the 
price of oil." 
It is extremely unlikely that Hussein 
planned to invade Saudi Arabia. That 
country had long coordinated its oil pro-
duction policies with Iraq and had recently 
negotiated a non-aggression pact with 
Hussein. While not as powerful as Iraq, 
the Saudi military is larger and technologi-
cally far more advanced than was 
Kuwait's. Most importantly, throughout 
the Cold War, Hussein had observed that 
the Soviet Union never threatened the 
Saudi monarchy or U.S. dominance 'in the 
Gulf - in the words of former chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Max-
well Taylor, "the jugular vein of western 
capitalism. 11 An attack on Saudi Arabia 
would have guaranteed an overwhelming 
U.S. attack on Iraq. 
By adding Kuwait's vast oil reserves 
to those of Iraq, and by deploying his 
army within range of Saudi oil fields, Hus-
sein may well have sought to wield greater 
influence over the price of oil. At the time 
of the Iraqi invasion, he was pressing 
OPEC to raise the price of oil to $25 per 
barrel, while the Saudis were willing to 
settle for $21, a difference of 5 cents per 
gallon. As Friedman wrote, 11 one reason 
that the Bush administration is 
sending ... soldiers to Saudi Arabia is for 
the sake of five cents a gallon." 
''Burdensharing'' and U.S. Global Power 
The U.S. "way of life," and the global 
power on which it has been built, have 
been reinforced by U.S. power in the Mid-
dle East It is control over the flow of Mid-
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die East oil that has given the U.S. enor-
mous influence over the economies and 
policies of its allies: Western Europe, 
Japan, and the newly industrialized coun-
tries of the Pacific. This, and our cowboy 
culture, help explain why the Bush admin-
istration was unwilling to let UN. sanc-
tions take their toll before dispatching 
ground troops and unilaterally establishing 
a naval blockade. 
Bush's response to Iraq's invasion cre-
ated the political environment in which 
"butdensharing" could be further insti-
tutionalized. Its response also provided the 
political cover for U.S. troops to be 
deployed in large numbers to the bases 
built in Saudi Arabia during the Reagan 
years. Bush has used the confrontation to 
win agreements to build more U.S. bases 
in the region and to create a new alliance, 
including Syria, to reinforce U.S. power in 
the Middle East. 
As Bob Borosage and Michael T. 
Klare have described so well in the pages 
of The Nation, the Bush administration has 
used the crisis to shape the post-Cold War 
era. At a time when it faced increased eco-
nomic competition from its Trilateral part-
ners, Japan and Western Europe, it was 
anxious to discipline them and to reassert 
its leadership. Not only did Japan, in an 
unprecedented move, support the U .N. 
sanctions and provide billions of dollars in 
aid to Arab nations suffering because of 
lost trade with Iraq, it has also accepted 
heavier ''burdensharing" with promises to 
increase its subsidy for U.S. bases in 
Japan, possibly by as much as three billion 
dollars a year. 
Though the U.S. 's European (and 
Arab) allies have been hesitant to deploy 
significant numbers of troops or ships to 
Saudi Arabia or the Gulf, the European 
willingness to allow the use of NATO 
bases and forces for "out-of area" opera-
tions in the Middle East has confirmed the 
U.S.'s ability to use its European pillar of 
power in pursuit of its global interests. 
Washington has thus opened the post-Cold 
War era by consolidating considerable 
power over its major economic and geopo-
litical rivals. 
These are, of course, short term gains. 
Like Vietnam War operations that required 
the destruction of villages in order to 
"save" them, war in the Gulf will leave the 
oil fields burning and may well undermine 
the monarchies and autocracies it seeks to 
protect The sight of predominantly white 
''Christian" U.s.· troops decimating Arab 
lives and land could well lead to massive 
Resi.JI Newsleller 
Veterans were among those 
at recent Boston demo 
against war in the Gulf. 
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demonstrations, coups and revolutions 
throughout the Arab world, as happened in 
1967 when Israel defeated Egypt, Syria 
and Jordan. When this military binge is 
over, the U.S. will find that its economy is 
even less competitive with those of Japan 
and Europe than it was before. Billions of 
dollars, precious time, and precious human 
resources are once again being flushed 
down a military rat hole. 
War, Wild Cards, and Burning Oil 
The destructive power of the U.S. 
armada, Air Force, and land army 
deployed in the Gulf is awesome. The air-
·craft carriers and nearly all other ships the 
U.S. has deployed in the Gulf region are 
armed with missiles and tactical nuclear 
weapons. AWACs, stealth fighters, B-1 
and B-52 bombers can control the skies 
and destroy everything below them. Since 
the early-1980s, U.S. ground forces have 
been trained to fight nuclear as well as 
conventional war. Iraq has missiles that 
can reach Jidda and Tel Aviv. and Hussein 
has a history of resorting to chemical war-
fare and using his missiles against cities 
and innocent civilians. While Bush and 
Hussein can be certain that a U.S.-Iraq war 
will be devastating and very bloody, there 
are many uncertainties beyond the control 
of either Washington or Baghdad. 
Economic sanctions, diplomacy and a 
drawn out confrontation could force Hus-
sein to back down, as he did in his war 
November, 1990 
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with Iran. No one will win a U.S.-Iraq war. 
Hussein's cynical decision to take hostages 
guarantees that innocent people on all 
sides will die in the event of a U.S. attack. 
Should Bush decide that he will not be 
held hostage to hostages, he will still be 
faced with the fact that oil burns. A 
ground war to retain Kuwait or to topple 
Hussein will put the oil fields that Bush 
believes he must control out of com-
mission for many months - if not longer. 
Should Bush pursue the option of attempt-
ing to assassinate Hussein, he faces the 
probability that a successor will be as 
uncompromising. 
As the October 8 Israeli fusillade at 
the Temple Mount/Harme al Sherif, which 
killed 21 Palestinians and wounded 140, 
and the October 12 assassination of the 
Speaker of Egypt's parliament demon-
strated, there are also many wild cards. 
What incidents will lead Israel to take 
independent action and to once again 
bomb Iraq's nuclear reactors and research 
facilities? How would Hussein respond · to 
the sinking of an Iraqi ship? Would Bush 
retaliate if a U.S plane is shot down, or if a 
U.S. ship is again "accidentally" attacked 
by an Exocet missile? Responses to sabo-
tage and terrorism are unpredictable, and 
under pressure or attack Hussein might 
choose to lob a missile into Tel Aviv as he 
has threatened. Once the first missile is 
launched, escalation to full-scale war 
could all too easily follow. 
This is a frightening moment. It is 
frightening because of the military power 
deployed in the Middle East and its poten-
tial for wreaking monumental destruction. 
The war at home is also frightening. The 
Bush administration's efforts to create a 
war fever have whipped up anti-Arab 
racism, reinforced militarism, and have 
made the possibility of economic and 
social reconstruction of the U.S. even 
more remote. 
The responsibilities of the peace 
movement in this period should be clear. 
We must condemn and resist both the Iraqi 
invasion and the U.S. intervention. All for-
eign armies should go home. All of them. 
The way forward is through creative 
diplomacy and the forceful use of the eco-
nomic sanctions that the U.N., with the 
support of the Bush administration, has 
rightly imposed. (These do not include 
embargoes of food and humanitarian sup-
plies.) It lies in active diplomacy support-
ing all nations' rights to self-determination 
and security, including Kuwait's and 
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Palestine's as well as Israel's. It lies in 
continuing efforts to convert the U.S.'s fal-
tering wartime economy into a productive 
economy that serves the security of the 
people of the U.S. This is a time for 
demonstrations, civil disobedience, pickets 
and vigils, letters to the editor, telephone 
calls, and letters and visits to members of 
Congress. We've been here before and we 
know the way. 10/15/90 • 
Joseph Gerson is the Peace Education 
Secretary of the New England Regional 
Office of the American Friends Service 
Committee. He is the co-editor of The Sun 
Never Sets ... Confronting the Network of 
Foreign U.S. Military Bases to be pub-
lished this winter by South End Press. This 
article. prepared for Resist is an updated 
and expanded version of an earlier piece 
which appeared in Peacework (Sept., 
19<JO). 
********************** 
We Thought You Might 
be Interested ... 
The 1991 War Resisters League's 
Peace Calendar is a book you 'II want to 
refer to for more than upcoming demos 
and meetings. Edited by Pat Farren of 
AFSC, and with an introduction by 
Maggie Kuhn of the Gray Panthers, A 
Way of Life honors women and men who 
have invested their lives in work for 
justice and peace. Each page of the desk 
calendar profiles an activist from a 
different state, including biographical 
information, a short essay and a 
photograph. Many of the individuals 
portrayed are those who work behind the 
scenes and rarely get the recognition they 
so deserve. From Vietnam era protesters 
to young campus radicals, from civil 
rights workers to organizers fighting for 
the rights of recent immigrants and 
refugees, these stories are what we need 
to encourage all of us in the ongoing 
struggle for justice in the U.S. and the 
world. The calendar was co-published by 
the War Resisters League and New 
Society Publishers, and is available for 
$9.95. For ordering info, call (212) 228-
0450. 
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tion, an Affordable Housing Conference, 
and annual week-long programs focused 
on Central America. The Center has a 
strong commitment to coalition work 
around critical local issues such as hous-
ing, voter registration in public housing 
projects, and opposition to KKK presence 
in the area. 
The Center's goals are to promote a 
region-wide climate of open discussion 
and greater sensitivity to both local and 
international peace and justice issues; to 
provide technical assistance to other 
groups; to respond to local acts of social 
violence and militarism; and to serve as a 
clearinghouse for educational resources. 
The organization provides an extensive 
collection of journals, audio-visuals and 
books; publishes a monthly newsletter . 
with a calendar of area political projects 
and events; and provides a speaker's 
bureau. Projects include the Military 
Recruitment Awareness Project which 
works with teachers to present young peo-
ple with information that will enable them 
to make critically discerning decisions 
about the military as a career. 
The Frederick County Citizen's Task 
Force on Economic Conversion, another 
project of the Center,' seeks. to inform 
activists, elected officials and business and 
community leaders on alternative priorities 
for federal spending. The Center wants to 
see tax dollars returned to the community 
for economic development and job train-
ing independent of military contracts. The 
organization's extensive research has 
found that local citizens pay approximately 
$2(i()() each annually in federal taxes, 
out of which 50% goes directly to the mili-
tary, a total amounting to more than2 1/2 
times what the County spends on edlr....a-
tion. The Conversion project aims to 
reveal the negative effects of military 
spending on the local communitv. and the 
positive prospects for economic conver-
sion - specifically examining how the 
personnel, resources and facilities of local 
military contractors could be used to meet 
the real needs of the community. 
Resist's grant was used toward a pub-
licity campaign for the Conversion project, 
so that facts about t!1e local impact of mili-
tary spending could be widely disseminat-
ed in display ads, brochures and op-ed 
articles. The Center also plans to include 
updatedinf ormationabout conversion in 
its newsletter; and to hold a local confer-
·ence on the topic focusing on both local 
and national conversion issues. 
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In this issue of Resist we highlight recent 
grants to peace and anti-militarist groups. 
The information in these brief reports is 
provided to us by the groups themselves. 
For more information, please contact 
them at the addresses provided. 
Veterans Peace Action Teams, P.O. Box 
170670, San Francisco, CA, 94117. 
Veterans Peace Action Teams (VPA1) 
was formed by S. Brian Willson and Dun-
can Murphy following their fast on the 
capitol steps protesting U.S. policies in 
Central America in the fall of 1986. VPAT 
recruits, trains, and sends veterans and 
non-veterans to stand in solidarity with 
people who are directly suffering the 
effects of U.S. foreign and domestic poli-
cy. In 1987, VPAT was invited by the 
Nicaraguan Union of Fanners and Ranch-
ers (UNAG) to send construction brigades 
to the Cua-Bocay valley to repair damage 
caused by the contras. Five subsequent 
VPAT teams rebuilt a destroyed health 
clinic in El Cedro, a fann cooperative in 
the valley, and built latrines and a school. 
VPAT, now with a 12-person, multi-
racial board and a two-person staff, 
believes that all military veterans are 
indoctrinated with a racist, sexist and 
homophobic nationalism sustained by mil-
itarism. The organization seeks the person-
al transformation of U.S. veterans and the 
social transfonnation of U.S. society away 
from militarism and violence. VPAT is 
opposed to all fonns of U.S. intervention 
in other countries, "particularly where 
such intervention changes the natural 
development of a people or nation." Many 
VPAT members are combat veterans, 
many from the Vietnam war. Their partici-
pation in convoys and delegations has pro-
vided a way for these vets to reevaluate 
and heal from their own pain, transform-
ing grief and anger into action. VPAT is 
active in pursuing social change in concert 
with other groups focused on peace and 
justice issues. 
VPAT is committed to helping pre-
serve the accomplishments of the 
Nicaraguan revolution. Currently there are 
four long-term VPAT members in 
Nicaragua in a five-year development pro-
ject with UNAG to revitalize coffee pro-
duction in the Cua-Bocay valley. The 
VPAT health brigade in Nicaragua is car-
rying on its work with emotional and 
stress related illnesses, and popular health 
education. VPAT also works on behalf of 
wounded combatants in El Salvador, and 
plans to provide accompaniment to return-
ing Salvadoran refugees. 
In the U.S., VPAT has begun to 
respond to Dine (Navajo) and Hopi 
requests for aid at Big Mountain, believing 
that the same U.S.policy of "low-intensity 
warfare" practiced in Central America is 
resulting in cultural genocide of native 
peoples here at home. In March, 1989, 
Elders from both tribes asked VPAT to 
organize a convoy of aid to help them 
resist forced relocation from their ancestral 
homelands, and to focus public attention 
on the struggle. VPAT worked with exist-
ing Big Mountain support groups, envi-
ronmental groups, and veterans groups to 
bring material aid from over 30 cities in 
the U.S. to some 300 families living on the 
former Joint Use Area. VPAT also coordi-
nated a campaign of public education and 
publicity. Resist's grant was used to create 
and distribute organizing packets for the 
Big Mountain Convoy. 
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Women's International League For 
Peace and Freedom, Southeast Region, 
P.O. Box 330056, Miami, Florida, 33233-
0056. 
The Women's International League 
for Peace and Freedom, (WILPF) has been 
working on peace and anti-militarism 
issues since 1915, focusing on the roots of 
war and on the peaceful resolution of con-
flict. The organization's current national 
priorities are racial justice, disarmament 
by the year 2000, ending US global inter-
vention, and a renewed commitment to 
women's rights. WILPFs U.S. section has 
been made up of four regions since the 
early 1970s. 
The southeastern region, region 3, has 
participated in demonstrations against the 
militarization of the space program at 
Cape Canaveral, and at the Savannah 
River Plant, and has organized around the 
federal budget, civil rights, U.S. interven-
tion in Ceo tral America, farm worker 
issues, labor issues, reproductive rights 
and environmental issues. Despite the 
commitment of the long-time members, 
the Southeast region of WILPF has always 
had the fewest members and fewest local 
"branches." Because of this, and the harsh 
political climate, the region has initiated 
an aggressive program of outreach for the 
organization in the southeast 
In order to demonstrate the special 
relevance of WILPF for a wide variety of 
women in the region, WII..PF organized its 
biennial meeting this fall to include work-
shops on racism, women's impoverish-
ment, institutional child neglect, immigra-
tion injustices, militarization, the 
disproportionately high numbers of 
women at southern military bases, and 
women in prison - including the re_place-
ment for the high security unit for women, 
fonnerly in Lexington, KY, now in place 
in Marianna, Florida. Resist's grant was 
used to do widespread outreach for this 
meeting, and to assist women to partici-
pate by providing scholarships. 
Peace Resource Center, 8 West Church 
St, P.O. Box 7, Frederick, MD, 21701. 
The Peace Resource Center, estab-
lished and sponsored by Western Mary-
land Clergy and Laity Concerned, was 
founded in 1986 to promote peace, social 
justice and environmental sanity in the 
Frederick, Maryland area. Members of the 
Center have organized a broad range of 
educational events including an annual 
Martin Luther King Memorial Celebra-
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